The parliamentary elections held in Armenia on June 7, 2026, determined the composition of the 9th convocation of the National Assembly and, in a certain sense, became a public choice regarding the state's foreign policy and security orientation. According to the final data of the Central Electoral Commission, the Civil Contract party received 726,819 votes or 49.7456%, the Strong Armenia alliance received 340,006 votes or 23.2710%, and Robert Kocharyan's Armenia alliance received 144,983 votes or 9.9231%. 1,476,769 voters, or 58.9% of the electorate, participated in the elections. This result allows the ruling force to form a government but does not provide it with a constitutional majority.[1][2]
This part of the post-election situation was also important in terms of domestic politics and external security. The issue of constitutional amendments is additionally linked to the peace agenda, as Azerbaijan continues to demand the revision of those constitutional formulations that Baku interprets as the basis for territorial claims. Consequently, the legal-political part of the peace process did not conclude after the elections. It transitioned into a more difficult phase, where the ruling force received a mandate to continue its course, but not the ability to single-handedly make and adopt comprehensive decisions regarding the most sensitive constitutional component of that course.[2]
The pre-election campaign and the voting process took place under conditions of high polarization and external pressure. International observers noted that voters had a genuine opportunity to choose, but the process was accompanied by external pressure, informational manipulation, and unequal campaign conditions. Damien Cottier, the head of the PACE delegation, specifically noted that pressures and threats from the Russian authorities had reached an unprecedented and alarming level. Following the elections, this external pressure transformed into harsher rhetoric from Moscow, with Yerevan now being required to clarify its position between the EU direction and Russian integration systems.[3]
Moscow's primary demand at this moment is to obtain a forced orientation from Armenia.During the post-election days, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized that the issue of Armenia moving closer to the EU while simultaneously remaining within the EAEU and the system formed around the CSTO must be resolved quickly. Thus, Russia is effectively demanding that Yerevan abandon its previous model of multi-vector diplomacy, which for a long time allowed it to simultaneously maintain the Russian security infrastructure and develop the Western direction.[4]
The crisis in relations with the CSTO, however, did not begin with the elections. It is the result of a prolonged degradation of allied obligations. Amidst the Azerbaijani incursions into the sovereign territory of Armenia in 2021 and 2022, Yerevan appealed to the CSTO, expecting not only a political but also a security response. The absence of such a response was perceived in Yerevan as a failure to fulfill allied commitments. In September 2023, when Nagorno-Karabakh came fully under the control of Azerbaijan, and more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians were forcibly displaced from the region in what amounted to ethnic cleansing, this distrust was definitively solidified.[5][6][7]
Yerevan's practical response evolved in stages. In February 2024, the freezing of participation in the CSTO was announced, after which Armenia suspended its financing of the organization and effectively withdrew from its events. This is a clear political signal. Yerevan no longer views the CSTO as a functioning security mechanism. This is where the paradox of the "institutional matryoshka" emerges. Armenia can distance itself from the CSTO, but this does not eliminate the system of the Russian military presence, because its most important layers are located not in the legal framework regulating relations with the CSTO, but at the core of Armenian-Russian bilateral treaties. It is on this foundation that the 102nd Military Base, the allied obligations established by the 1997 treaty, the remnants of the Russian border guard presence, the joint air defense system, and the Joint Group of Forces are maintained.[8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15]
The Armenian-Russian security architecture must be examined in two layers on the same plane. The first is the CSTO, a multilateral format that is currently deeply frozen. The second is the bilateral military-legal treaty foundation, which continues to operate. The central element of this layer is the 102nd Russian Military Base deployed in Gyumri. Its legal basis was formed by the 1995 agreement, and in 2010 the deployment period of the base was extended until 2044. Therefore, the freezing of one layer in the same plane, the CSTO, does not in itself resolve the legal issue of the 102nd base, the joint defense systems, and the Russian presence.[10]
The other axis of the bilateral system's layer is the 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. In formal terms, it preserves the foundation of allied relations, but its weak point is that the document does not contain clear, automated procedures for requesting and providing military assistance. The absence of detailed mechanisms leaves Moscow a wide space for military-political interpretation, which became particularly obvious after the events of 2021 and 2022.[11][12]
Another type of Russian presence and a separate form of relations is the active border guard system, which is sometimes confused with the status of the 102nd base. In 2024, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian forces and border guards from several parts of Armenia, including the main airport in Yerevan. However, the presence of Russian border guards on the borders with Turkey and Iran has not completely disappeared. This means that even after the partial withdrawal of the Russian border guards, Moscow retains a significant opportunity to influence Armenia's border, logistical, and security environment.[13]
On the one hand, Armenia is politically distancing itself from the CSTO, and on the other hand, it is developing relations with the EU and the US, but at the same time it maintains the Russian military-legal infrastructure on its territory. From the perspective of defense planning, this creates an incompatibility of doctrines, communication systems, radar identification, and operational standards. The situation is also complicated by the fact that building full European or Western security interoperability is difficult if the existing military infrastructures, even in a formal sense, continue to remain within the Armenian legal security system.[4][11]
Beyond the military component, energy and logistical dependencies are among the most practical risks of the transitional period. In May 2026, Russia warned that if Armenia continues its EU trajectory, it could suspend or terminate the preferential supply agreement for natural gas, petroleum products, and rough diamonds. The ownership structure of the gas network, along with the Russian monopolistic presence, has become a genuine instrument of social and economic pressure.
A similar vulnerability exists in the railway system, where Russian control could complicate the development of Armenia's alternative communication routes. This is particularly sensitive at a time when Yerevan is attempting to shape a new transit and communications agenda, including through projects with Western involvement. The issue here is naturally not just the technical operation of the lines, but rather who controls the future hubs of Armenia's external connectivity.[16][17][18]
These listed challenges cannot be resolved hastily or through political declarations alone. First and foremost, genuine replacement security and economic mechanisms are required. This takes into account the fact that such a situation cannot last long, and maintaining the status quo is equally dangerous.
It is also obvious that the process of withdrawing from the Russian defense alliance has opened the opportunity to shape new security contours. The mandate of the EU civilian mission has been extended until February 2027, while the EU's 270 million euro Resilience and Growth Plan, the EU-Armenia strategic agenda, and the strategic partnership with the United States provide Yerevan with a political and institutional pillar to gradually reduce Russian dependencies. Nevertheless, external pillars can only be effective if they do not replace one dependency with another, but rather create a legitimate legal system, strengthen Armenia's domestic institutions, defense governance, and the capacity to withstand crises.[19][20][21]
Thus, to achieve success in this unprecedented security transition, Armenia needs to implement a strategy of "institutional replacement". The state must utilize the political and financial umbrella of the European Union, including the EUMA mission and the Resilience and Growth Plan, alongside US diplomatic influence within the framework of the TRIPP project and strategic partnership, to gradually push Russian entities out of critical sectors of the economy and defense.[18][19][20][21] Only the delicate management of this asymmetric transition balancing between the deterrence of the former ally's aggression and the rapid integration of new partners' resources, real reforms, the modernization of the law enforcement field, and the unbending political will to implement democratic reforms must accompany genuine internal reforms, the modernization of the law enforcement field, and the organization of the constitutional process based on the principles of progressive democratic practices, public participation, and maximum transparency. This is because if the agenda for the Constitution or constitutional amendments is perceived solely as the fulfillment of an external demand, it could become the weak link of the entire democratic transition.[22][23] Consequently, both the external and internal transformation processes must be realized based on high benchmarks of legitimacy and legality.
Cited Sources
1. Armenpress, “CEC Announces Final Results of Armenia’s Parliamentary Elections,” June 14, 2026, https://armenpress.am/en/article/1252978
2. ConstitutionNet, “In Armenia, Constitutional Change Is Uncertain After Pro-Reform Party Loses Necessary Majority,” June 11, 2026, https://constitutionnet.org/news/armenia-constitutional-change-uncertain-after-pro-reform-party-loses-necessary-majority
3. OSCE/ODIHR, “Armenia’s Voters Were Offered a Genuine Choice Against a Backdrop of Direct Foreign Pressure and Uneven Campaign Opportunities,” June 8, 2026, https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/665473 .
4. Reuters, “Russia Says Armenia’s Future in Post-Soviet Military and Economic Blocs Must Be Settled Soon,” June10,2026,https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-says-armenias-future-post-soviet-military-economic-blocs-must-be-settled-2026-06-10/
5. Armenpress, “Armenia Asked CSTO for Military Support to Restore Territorial Integrity Amid Azeri Attack – PM,” September 14, 2022, https://armenpress.am/en/article/1092504.
6. Reuters, “More Than 100,000 Refugees Arrive in Armenia as Exodus Swells,” September 30, 2023, https://armenpress.am/en/article/1092504
7. Freedom House, “New Report: Azerbaijani Regime Ethnically Cleansed Nagorno-Karabakh According to International Fact-Finding Mission,” November 11, 2024, https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-azerbaijani-regime-ethnically-cleansed-nagorno-karabakh-according-international.
8. Reuters, “Armenia Freezes Participation in Russia-Led Security Bloc – Prime Minister,” February 23, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/armenia-freezes-participation-russia-led-security-bloc-prime-minister-2024-02-23/ .
9. Interfax, “Armenia Ceases Financing of CSTO – Foreign Ministry,” May 8, 2024, https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/102137/ .
10. Harvard Davis Center, “Russian Military Base in Armenia at Eye of a Geopolitical Storm,” March 29, 2024, https://daviscenter.fas.harvard.edu/insights/russian-military-base-armenia-eye-geopolitical-storm
11. United Nations Digital Library, “Letter Dated 9 September 1997 from the Representatives of the Russian Federation and Armenia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,” September 11, 1997,https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/243780 .
12. Fact Investigation Platform, “What Is Provided for by the 1997 Armenian-Russian Agreement and What Is Written in the Russian-Azerbaijani Agreement?” November 16, 2021, https://fip.am/en/35787 .
13. Reuters, “Putin Agrees to Withdraw Russian Forces from Various Armenian Regions, Says Ifax,” May 9, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-agrees-withdraw-russian-forces-various-armenian-regions-says-ifax-2024-05-09/
14. Reuters, “Armenia Ratifies Agreement on Joint Air-Defence System with Russia,” June 30, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/armenia-ratifies-agreement-on-joint-air-defence%20system-with-russia-idUSKCN0ZG2B1/
15. Kremlin, “Law to Ratify Russian-Armenian Agreement on Joint Group of Forces,” July 26, 2017, https://www.en.special.kremlin.ru/catalog/countries/AM/events/55138
16. Reuters, “Russia Warns Armenia on Supplies over EU Bid; Trump Backs PM Pashinyan,” May 27, 2026, updated May 28, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-warns-armenia-it-could-end-cheap-fuel-supplies-if-yerevan-continues-eu-2026-05-27/
17. RFE/RL, “Armenia Wants In on Asia-Europe Trade. Russian Rail Control Stands in the Way,” April 26, 2026, https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-wants-in-on-asia-europe-trade-russian-rail-control-stands-in-the-way/33738123.html
18. Prime Minister of Armenia, “Joint Declaration by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the President of the United States of America,” August 9, 2025, https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2025/08/09/Nikol-Pashinyan-visit-US-declaration/
19. EEAS, “About European Union Mission in Armenia,” January 7, 2026,
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/euma/about-european-union-mission-armenia_en
10. Council of the European Union, “Armenia,”
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/armenia/
22. Reuters, “US and Armenia Sign Strategic Partnership Agreement Ahead of Armenian Elections,” May 26, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-armenia-sign-strategic-partnership-agreement-ahead-armenian-elections-2026-05-26/
22. Stjórnlagaráð, “The Constitutional Council – General Information,” 2011, https://stjornlagarad.is/english/
23. International IDEA, Practical Considerations for Public Participation in Constitution-Building: What, When, How and Why? July 9, 2021, https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/practical%20considerations-public-participation-constitution-building
