Executive Summary
Russia’s influence in Armenia has undergone major changes since the 2020 war. Moscow has lost substantial influence, including its role as a security guarantor and mediator in the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process. Moreover, in recent years, Russia has been forced to reduce its security presence in Armenia and has lost its monopoly as an arms supplier as well as much of its public trust. At the same time, Armenia has been able to diversify its arms supplies, strengthen its defence industry and broaden its security partnerships, thereby creating greater political room for manoeuvre. This, in turn, has facilitated a stronger alignment with the EU and the US and the freezing of Armenia’s participation in the CSTO, economic tensions within the EAEU, including restrictions affecting some Armenian products.
However, Armenia remains vulnerable to Russian economic and energy pressure, increasing the relative importance of potentially more coercive forms of Russian leverage. Russia also retains substantial influence through critical infrastructure, societal instruments and the Armenian diaspora.
Armenia should therefore use the current window of opportunity to accelerate economic and energy diversification. Its successful diversification of arms supplies demonstrates that reducing dependencies can expand political room for manoeuvre. Until similar progress is achieved in the economy and energy sector, Yerevan should calibrate its political diversification to its ability to withstand potential Russian pressure.
Introduction: Historical Foundations of Russian Influence
The wars of 2020, 2022 and 2023 led Armenia to move away from its traditional partner, Russia, and seek alternative security and political partnerships. Russia’s influence in Armenia has a long history and can be divided into three major periods. First, the Russo-Persian War of 1826–1828 resulted in the Treaty of Turkmenchay, which established Tsarist Russia’s hegemony over Eastern Armenia. During this period, Armenia witnessed repatriation and a cultural awakening alongside growing Russian cultural influence in the region. The second period of Russian hegemony was marked by Soviet rule over Armenia. The post-independence period represents the third and most recent phase of Russian influence in and over Armenia. During this period, Russia was able to consolidate its influence through its role as Armenia’s key political, security and economic partner, generally high levels of public trust until 2020, and various soft-power instruments.
Institutionally, Russia’s presence in modern-day Armenia is based on bilateral agreements signed between Armenia and Russia in the 1990s, as well as Armenia’s membership in Russian-led security, political and economic organisations such as the CSTO, CIS and EAEU. Other cornerstones of Russia’s historical influence in Armenia included its military presence, control over parts of Armenia’s critical infrastructure, and the country’s economic dependence on Russia in several sectors.
While Russia possessed a range of instruments and levers in the past, its influence in the region, particularly in Armenia, is changing. However, this does not imply that Russian influence is disappearing. While some levers of influence are declining, others are becoming increasingly important. This policy brief examines which Russian levers of influence have declined, which remain in place, and what implications these changes may have.
Decrease of Russia’s Traditional Levers of Influence
The erosion of Russia’s traditional tools of influence in the region, particularly in Armenia, is a long-term, gradual and multi-layered process. For analytical clarity, this erosion can be divided into five major fields: the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, security presence, arms supplies and the defence industry, foreign policy influence, and domestic politics and public trust.
Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Process
For decades, one of Russia’s most valuable selling propositions was the perception that only Russia was capable of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, reinforced by its status as the regional hegemon. Over the years, Russia was able to use the unresolved conflict to maintain its regional presence and influence the balance of power between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Moscow-centred platforms played an important role in efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and advance the peace process.
The 2020 war and the subsequent withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Nagorno-Karabakh seriously weakened Russia’s position in the region and reduced its leverage over both Armenia and Azerbaijan. This trend became even more pronounced following the August 8 Washington summit and the initialling of the Peace Agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, further weakening Russia’s role as a regional security guarantor. The growing US role in the peace process demonstrated that Armenia and Azerbaijan were increasingly able to pursue negotiations outside traditional Russian-led formats, while the agreement on TRIPP further expanded the US role from diplomatic mediation to regional connectivity. For Armenia, these developments demonstrated that Russian security mechanisms were either dysfunctional or that Russia was, at least, unwilling to fulfil its obligations. The peace process and the Washington summit were, among other factors, facilitated by Russia’s increasingly difficult relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. While Russia had previously managed to maintain closer relations with one side when relations with the other deteriorated, its foreign policy after 2020 and 2023 contributed to bringing Armenia and Azerbaijan closer together.
Reduction of Russia’s Security Presence
Russia’s military presence in Armenia included the 102nd Military Base in Gyumri, FSB border guard troops at Zvartnots International Airport and checkpoints along the Armenian-Iranian and Armenian-Turkish borders, as well as deployments along the green borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iran. While the Russian presence along the Armenian-Iranian and Armenian-Turkish borders was based on the 1992 bilateral treaty between Armenia and the Russian Federation, Russian border guards were deployed along sections of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.
Following a formal request by the Armenian government, Russian FSB troops fully withdrew from Zvartnots International Airport in 2024. In the same year, as a result of bilateral negotiations, Russian troops also left the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. By January 1, 2025, Russian FSB border guard troops had also withdrawn from checkpoints along the Armenian-Iranian and Armenian-Turkish borders, while remaining deployed along parts of the green borders. Currently, several border sections between Armenia, Iran and Turkey are jointly controlled by Armenian and Russian troops. Armenia has linked this step-by-step withdrawal to the growing capabilities of its own border guard troops.
Despite the substantial reduction of Russia’s border guard presence, an important component of Russia’s military presence in Armenia remains in place: the 102nd Russian Military Base in Gyumri. More broadly, parts of the Armenian-Russian security architecture continue to rest on bilateral agreements, including the legal frameworks governing the 102nd Russian Military Base, the joint air defence system and the Joint Group of Forces, which remain in place despite Armenia’s frozen participation in the CSTO.
Diversification of Arms Supplies and Strengthening of the Defence Industry
When it comes to arms supplies and the defence industry, Armenia has managed to reduce its dependence on Russia. More specifically, in 2020, around 96% of Armenia’s arms supplies came from Russia; by 2025, this figure had fallen to less than 10%, largely reflecting ongoing contracts. Armenia instead diversified its foreign suppliers by deepening defence cooperation primarily with India, France and several other EU countries. Second, Armenia has significantly strengthened its domestic defence industry in recent years, developing it from an almost non-existent sector into an increasingly important component of its defence sector. Over the past three years, Armenian defence companies have received state orders worth around AMD 170–172 billion, equivalent to approximately $460 million. In May 2026, for the first time in its modern history, Armenia also announced the export of domestically produced weapons to foreign countries.
The diversification process was driven by three major factors. First, Russia failed to deliver approximately $400 million worth of prepaid military equipment and weapons on time. Second, by reducing its dependence on Russian arms supplies, Armenia also sought to decrease its broader political dependence on Russia. Third, diversification created additional opportunities for Armenia in terms of both the price and quality of military equipment.
Foreign Policy Influence
Armenia’s historically strong pro-Russian orientation, both in foreign and domestic politics, began to change following the wars of 2020, 2022 and 2023. As a result of these conflicts and the declining trust between Armenia and Russia, Armenia gradually shifted its foreign policy by taking decisions that could be perceived as red lines from a Russian perspective. After 2023, Armenia gradually froze its active participation in the CSTO and reduced its engagement with CSTO-related bodies, formats and mechanisms. In 2024, Armenia joined the International Criminal Court, a step that was clearly perceived by the Kremlin as anti-Russian. In the same year, for the first time, high-level Armenian officials publicly expressed the ambition to become a member of the European Union, followed by the adoption of the law “On the Launch of the Process of Accession of the Republic of Armenia to the European Union” in 2025. At the same time, Armenia has substantially deepened its bilateral relations with the United States, further broadening its foreign policy partnerships beyond Russia.
One important factor shaping Russia’s response has been the Russo-Ukrainian war, which opened a window of opportunity for Armenia. However, this does not necessarily mean that Russia tolerates Armenia’s foreign policy shift. The war in Ukraine has absorbed considerable Russian attention and resources, reducing Moscow’s capacity to respond to developments in Armenia and other post-Soviet states.
Domestic Politics and Public Trust
When it comes to domestic politics, Russia has lost a substantial degree of its political influence, while preserving some residual influence. The Armenian Church, which traditionally held a unique position within Armenian statehood and considerable influence over Armenian society, has itself lost influence as a result of its standoff with the Armenian government. Parts of the Church and individual senior representatives have historically maintained close ties with former political elites associated with Armenia’s traditionally Russia-oriented governments. Before, during and after the 2026 parliamentary elections, the Armenian government also launched a campaign against pro-Russian oligarchs. As a result of these measures, the Electric Networks of Armenia was nationalised, several businesses belonging to Gagik Tsarukyan were confiscated, and both Gagik Tsarukyan and Samvel Karapetyan were arrested. While Russia has clearly lost substantial political influence in Armenia, Russia-oriented political forces have maintained a presence in the National Assembly. Moreover, while the ruling party secured an absolute majority, it failed to achieve a constitutional majority.
Closely linked to domestic politics is the Armenian population’s perception of Russia, which has deteriorated sharply in recent years. While 93% of Armenians in 2019 evaluated the state of relations between Armenia and Russia as good, this figure fell to 43% in 2025, after reaching an all-time low of 31% in 2023. According to 2025 polling, 45% of Armenians considered Russia the country’s most important political partner, while 27% viewed it as the greatest political threat. These figures illustrate not only the sharp deterioration in perceptions of Russia, but also the high degree of polarisation within Armenian society over the country’s relationship with Moscow.
Russia’s Remaining Leverages
However, it would be a mistake to assume that Russia no longer possesses effective instruments to influence Armenia. In fact, the relative importance of its remaining levers has increased in recent years.
Economic Dependence
The Russian “sanctions” against Armenia imposed or threatened before, during and after the 2026 parliamentary elections were predominantly economic in nature. The underlying logic is understandable: as Russia’s public standing has declined and its ability to exercise influence through domestic political and institutional channels has weakened, economic and energy-related measures have gained importance as instruments of pressure. At the same time, Armenia has not only failed to substantially diversify its economy in recent years, but has actually increased its economic dependence on Russia. Several factors have contributed to this trend. Armenia’s overall trade volume has increased considerably in recent years, which has also translated into higher trade volumes with Russia. A major factor has been the Russo-Ukrainian war and the subsequent increase in re-exports to and from Russia.
Although these measures have pushed Armenia to accelerate its diversification efforts and the EU to provide additional support, several obstacles remain. Logistical constraints, as well as problems related to standards and certification, remain unresolved or highly problematic. Second, many Armenian businesses entering the EU market struggle to establish a sustainable long-term presence. This can be considered an indicator of the challenges Armenian products face in remaining competitive in European markets, including pricing, marketing and compliance with standards. Third, both Armenia and the EU need long-term measures to ensure a sustainable diversification process. Many of the measures introduced during the 2026 election period should be regarded as rapid responses, with some being largely symbolic rather than constituting long-term mechanisms.
Many politicians and analysts compare the Armenian and Moldovan cases in terms of economic diversification. However, Armenia cannot simply replicate Moldova’s experience because the structural conditions are fundamentally different. In addition to its DCFTA with the EU, Moldova benefits from a common border with the EU, particularly close economic and cultural ties with Romania, and extensive EU-supported programmes facilitating adaptation to European standards.
Energy Dependence
Another significant instrument in Russia’s hands is its dominant position in Armenia’s energy sector. Russia not only holds a de facto monopoly over Armenia’s gas supply, but Gazprom Armenia, a wholly owned subsidiary of Russia’s Gazprom, also controls and operates Armenia’s gas transmission and distribution infrastructure, which in turn constrains Armenia’s room for manoeuvre. In particular, Russia could seriously harm Armenia’s economy and undermine its economic resilience by drastically increasing gas prices or cutting gas supplies. Both scenarios would have a significant impact on Armenian businesses. For example, Armenia’s flower industry is competitive, among other factors, because relatively cheap gas is used to heat its greenhouses.
Beyond gas, nuclear energy represents another area in which Russia—at least for now—retains considerable leverage over Armenia. The Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant is Armenia’s only nuclear power plant and generates around one-third of the country’s domestic electricity. Although the plant belongs to the Republic of Armenia, Russia remains responsible for maintenance, fuel supply and life-extension programmes. While this gives Russia a strategic lever, Armenia has simultaneously expanded its solar capacity in recent years and is seeking new partners for the construction of a new nuclear power plant, potentially a small modular reactor (SMR). At the current stage, Armenia is negotiating with several potential partners, including France, the United States, Russia and South Korea, and has signed a Section 123 Agreement with the United States, a prerequisite for peaceful nuclear cooperation.
Concessions of Critical Infrastructure
Besides the gas infrastructure, Russia’s South Caucasus Railway also holds the management concession for Armenia’s railway network. The agreement was signed in 2008 for a period of 30 years. In light of the Crossroads of Peace project and the potential opening of regional transport links, Russia’s concession rights represent a potential strategic risk in several ways. First, through its concession rights, Russia could complicate or obstruct the implementation of infrastructure projects linked to the existing railway network. Second, the involvement of a Russian-owned company could discourage Western, particularly European, investors from supporting projects connected to the railway network. Without the inclusion of the railway network, the Crossroads of Peace project would remain incomplete and lose part of its geostrategic significance. More specifically, this could directly affect both Armenia’s North-South and East-West connectivity. Although Armenia has several options for addressing the concession issue, these would entail both political and financial costs.
Political and Societal Leverage
While the Armenian government learned important lessons from the 2021 elections and was able to constrain Russian influence in several areas, Russia intensified its hybrid activities during the 2026 elections. In particular, Russia conducted disinformation campaigns and spread fabricated allegations, partly relying on proxy networks such as “Matryoshka” and “Storm-1516”. For instance, the Matryoshka network coordinated social media campaigns across multiple platforms, including X and TikTok.
Russia also sought to use the Armenian diaspora as a channel to influence the elections. According to relevant Armenian state agencies and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), Russian operations heavily targeted members of the Armenian diaspora holding dual citizenship, encouraging them to vote against Pashinyan. Beyond electoral influence, Russia has also signalled possible restrictions affecting Armenians residing in Russia, particularly labour migrants. Such measures could affect Armenia through declining remittances and potentially trigger increased return migration.
Although pro-Russian parties were unable to win the elections, their parliamentary presence contributed to preventing the government from securing a constitutional majority, thereby strengthening their relative political position. The absence of a two-thirds majority could also complicate the adoption of a new constitution and, consequently, the implementation of the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement.
Policy Implications
Russia is well aware that its ability to influence Armenian politics through institutional and political mechanisms, as well as through its traditional role as a security guarantor, has declined substantially in recent years. As these instruments have weakened, Moscow has increasingly signalled its willingness to rely on economic and energy-related pressure. Armenia remains particularly vulnerable in these areas, as its economic diversification efforts face substantial structural constraints, ranging from product standards and certification to logistics and the absence of a common border with the EU. Similarly, increasing energy prices or disrupting supplies could have direct consequences for both the Armenian economy and the population. Russia’s influence has therefore shifted from predominantly embedded and legitimised forms towards increasingly coercive forms of leverage.
Paradoxically, the so-called “EU law”, adopted by the Armenian parliament in 2025, could itself become an instrument of Russian pressure. This is not necessarily because the law represents Russia’s most significant red line, but because Moscow can use it to justify further economic and energy-related restrictions and portray Armenia as moving decisively away from Russia. Russian officials have consequently called for a referendum on possible EU membership and argued that Armenia cannot simultaneously pursue EU integration while remaining in the EAEU. From Moscow’s perspective, Armenia seeks to benefit from EAEU membership while preparing for closer integration with the EU.
Against the backdrop of current economic restrictions, Russia has also signalled potentially harsher measures. Senior Russian officials have referred to a possible “re-evaluation of gas prices” and the need to protect the Russian and EAEU markets should Armenia pursue EU membership. Economic and energy-related pressure is therefore likely to remain among Russia’s most important levers of influence. At the same time, Moscow could use its remaining political and infrastructural leverage to complicate the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, the Crossroads of Peace initiative and Armenia’s broader diversification efforts, including through Russia-oriented domestic political actors.
The extent of Russian interference also depends on another factor: the war in Ukraine, which has created a window of opportunity not only for Armenia, but also for other post-Soviet states. The war has constrained Russian resources and attention while providing Armenia with greater room to diversify its security partnerships and reduce some of its dependencies. From a Russian perspective, however, this window of opportunity does not give Armenia carte blanche to move away from Russia without potentially facing consequences. Armenia’s most significant achievement during this period has been the diversification of its arms suppliers and the strengthening of its domestic defence industry. The critical question, however, is not only what Russia is willing and able to do at the moment, but also what it could do after the end of the war in Ukraine, particularly if Armenia does not manage to substantially reduce its economic and energy dependence by then.
In this context, it is important for Armenia to accelerate its economic and energy diversification efforts in order to strengthen its resilience and reduce vulnerabilities that could be translated into coercive leverage by Russia. Political diversification, on the other hand, can only be sustainable if accompanied by sufficient economic and energy diversification. Armenia’s recent security policy illustrates this logic: the diversification of arms supplies and the strengthening of its domestic defence industry reduced Armenia’s dependence on Russia and provided Yerevan with greater room for manoeuvre to freeze its participation in the CSTO. By contrast, economic and energy diversification has progressed considerably more slowly. This creates a potentially dangerous mismatch: while Armenia has increasingly signalled a political orientation towards European integration through statements by senior Armenian officials and the 2025 EU law, it remains vulnerable to Russian economic and energy pressure. Until these dependencies are substantially reduced, Armenia should therefore calibrate the pace of its political westward orientation and pursue a more balanced foreign policy.
Conclusion
Armenian foreign policy in recent years has contributed to the erosion of Russia’s traditional levers of influence in several areas. Moscow has lost much of its former role as Armenia’s security guarantor and arms supplier, while its security presence, foreign policy influence and public trust have declined. The war in Ukraine has created a further window of opportunity for Armenia to diversify its security and foreign policy partnerships and freeze its participation in the Russian-led CSTO.
This, however, does not imply that Russia lacks effective levers of influence. Rather, Russian influence has shifted from predominantly embedded and legitimised forms towards increasingly coercive ones. Moscow remains Armenia’s largest economic partner and retains substantial economic, energy and infrastructural leverage. These structural dependencies are complemented by political and societal instruments, including the diaspora.
While Armenia has achieved substantial diversification in arms supplies and strengthened its domestic defence industry, it has made considerably less progress in diversifying its economy and energy sector. The experience of 2013 illustrates the risks of such a mismatch: Armenia pursued closer relations with the EU while Russia retained substantial security, political, economic and energy leverage, leaving Yerevan vulnerable to Russian pressure. Armenia’s recent security diversification, by contrast, demonstrates how reducing such dependencies can expand its room for political manoeuvre. Until then, Armenia should pursue a more calibrated foreign policy while strengthening its resilience to Russian pressure.
